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Politics of urban energy transitions: a case study of new energy 
vehicle (NEV) development in Shenzhen, China 
Abstract: Cities are critical arenas for low-carbon energy transitions as a means 
to address challenges of climate change and sustainable development. This 
article explores the unfolding transition politics during new energy vehicle 
(NEV) implementation in Shenzhen, China. It shows that two competing 
processes of urban energy transitions (destabilizing and stabilizing dominant 
regimes) confront each other in the battleground of urban materiality, 
particularly the construction of charging infrastructure. This paper argues for 
reflexive and interactive transition governance that highlights the capacity of 
learning and adjustment of not only policy-makers but also other transition 
actors.  
Keywords: politics; urban energy transitions; governance; new energy vehicle, 
China 
1. Introduction 
Cities are increasingly recognized as critical arenas for addressing the challenges of 
climate change and sustainability development (Coutard and Rutherford 2010). Low-
carbon discourse is increasingly central in urban politics (Bulkeley and Betsill 2005, 
Jonas et al. 2011). Urban low-carbon energy transitions, in particular, respond to the 
global imperative of the decarbonization of current energy systems.  
Urban energy governance represents ‘the multitude of ways in which urban 
actors engage with energy systems, flows and infrastructures to meet particular 
collective goals and needs’ (Rutherford and Jaglin 2015: p. 174). Multilevel 
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governments are taking the lead in designing policies, forming partnerships and 
enforcing actions. However, experiences gained from urban experiments within a 
diversity of contexts suggest that a low-carbon transition does not follow a clear 
roadmap and is not a process that can simply be planned, managed and controlled. 
Rather, the urban energy transition is a messy, chaotic, and uncertain ‘reality’ that 
engages diverging interests, competing visions, and complex power relations 
(Meadowcroft 2009, Jaglin 2014, Rutherford and Coutard 2014, Huang et al. 2018). It 
is a process that inevitably redistributes benefits and costs, restructures existing power 
relations, and reconfigures systems of institutions.  
Urban energy transitions are intrinsically political (Truffer and Coenen 2012). 
Coutard and Rutherford (2010) conceptualize energy transitions as ‘political processes 
in/through which ideas and interests diverge’. Energy transitions and urban politics are 
seen as mutually constituted (Rutherford and Coutard 2014). On the one hand, deciding 
where boundaries should be drawn in relation to areas and the dimensions of change in 
transitions are inherently political judgements (Meadowcroft 2009). On the other hand, 
transitions redistribute benefits and costs, and alignment often needs to be reached 
between competing interests and visions (Castán Broto and Bulkeley 2013b).  
Recent years have witnessed a growing interest in the politics of low-carbon 
energy transitions (Bulkeley and Betsill 2013, Geels 2014, Hess 2014, Avelino et al. 
2016, Partzsch 2017). Some scholars try to sketch the contours of transition politics by 
borrowing from institutional theories (see for instance, Avelino and Wittmayer 2016, 
Lockwood et al. 2017), while others are more concerned with political processes 
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involved in transformations of urban materiality (see for instance, Rutherford 2014, 
Gailing and Moss 2016, McEwan 2017a, Wodrig 2018). The fact that the dynamics of 
local political discourse can dramatically shape transition trajectories (McFarlane and 
Rutherford 2008, Späth and Rohracher 2010, Hodson and Marvin 2012, Moss 2014) 
calls for fuller understandings of the politics of urban energy transitions. However, in 
mainstream sociotechnical analyses of sustainability transitions, the dynamic politics 
and power relations between actors are often underplayed (Meadowcroft 2011, 
Lockwood et al. 2017), and ‘an eternal search for consensus and unanimity’ is favored 
instead (Coutard and Rutherford 2010, p. 724).  
This brings us to energy transitions in China, where energy governance is often 
labeled as authoritarian (Cox 2016), and where the agency of other transition actors is 
generally assumed to be suppressed. Adding to the emerging body of literature on the 
politics of urban energy transitions (Truffer and Coenen 2012, Hodson and Marvin 
2010, Jaglin 2014), this study uses the case of new energy vehicle (NEV) 
implementation in Shenzhen, China to present an empirical illustration of the political 
dynamics that underlie urban energy transitions. The empirical analysis builds upon a 
novel analytical tool, the Dimensions of Urban Energy Transitions (DUET) framework 
(Huang and Castán Broto 2018), and focuses on the political dimension of energy 
transitions. The study shows that, even under the authoritarian governance system in 
China, different transition actors demonstrate significant agency in shaping urban 
energy transitions, reflected through the dynamics of changing discourses and the 
confrontation of different transition interests and visions. Through the Shenzhen case, 
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the study provides an exemplary illustration of the politics of urban energy transitions, 
that merits more detailed analysis. Centrally, we call for more adaptive and reflexive 
approaches to transition governance.   
The remainder of this article proceeds as follows. The next section explains the 
DUET framework, paying particular attention to its utility in understanding the politics 
of urban energy transitions. We then introduce the study area, methodology and data. 
We proceed with a systematic analysis of the politics of NEV development in 
Shenzhen, in which we explore three facets of the politics of urban energy transitions, 
before providing an in-depth discussion of the empirical results and our conclusions.  
The DUET framework  
In this study, we adopt Huang and Castán Broto’s (2018) DUET framework, 
which is the culmination of a two-year project on urban energy transitions in China. 
The DUET framework is a tool to systematically examine the multidimensional nature 
of urban energy transitions. Centrally, the framework conceptualizes three dimensions 
of urban energy transitions: 1) sociotechnical experimentation; 2) urban political 
processes; and 3) sociospatial (re)configuration (figure 1).  
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Figure 1. Three dimensions of the DUET framework (adapted from Huang and Castán 
Broto 2018) 
Sociotechnical experimentation denotes purposive efforts and activities to 
introduce new innovations into the urban context. Urban experiments aim at radical 
changes that would trigger various urban political processes and involve a wide range 
of actors. Transitions become manifest in the urban materiality when sociospatial 
configurations are transformed and reconfigured around the new technology. The first 
dimension of the DUET framework is built upon theories of innovation studies (e.g. the 
technological innovation system) that emphasize the processes of purposive innovation, 
while the dimensions of urban political processes and sociospatial (re)configuration are 
conceptualized based on the current debates about the necessity of incorporating the 
conceptions of politics and spatiality into transition studies. Originally developed 
within the context of China, the wider applicability of the DUET framework has been 
tested in a comparative meta-analysis of cases of urban energy transitions worldwide 
(see Huang and Castán Broto 2018). 
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The three dimensions of the DUET framework are simultaneous processes of 
change that encompass multiple sub-processes. In this study, we focus on the second 
dimension of the DUET framework: urban political processes. It involves three sub-
processes: destabilizing dominant regimes, stabilizing incumbent regimes, and urban 
material politics (figure 1). These processes deserve more attention because the 
dynamics of local political discourse about energy can dramatically change the 
direction of transition trajectories (McFarlane and Rutherford 2008, Späth and 
Rohracher 2010, Hodson and Marvin 2012, Castán Broto and Bulkeley 2013a, Moss 
2014). 
The first political process, destabilizing dominant regimes, describes how 
transitions emerge when predominant regimes are challenged by the introduction of 
new technologies into the urban context. Attempts to destabilize dominant regimes are 
well documented by a burgeoning body of literature on urban experiments (Castán 
Broto and Bulkeley 2013a, 2013b, Evans et al. 2016). Multilevel governments possess 
strong capacities in initiating radical changes through a variety of governance 
approaches (Rutherford and Jaglin 2015). The role of local governments in 
destabilizing dominant regimes is well demonstrated in many cities (see for instance, 
Li et al. 2016). Intermediaries are imperative for coordinating different future visions 
and competing, or even conflicting, priorities (Guy 2011). The introduction of new 
technologies into the urban contexts and the creation of niches are, however, not always 
as smooth as expected. Translation of policy into local contexts might encounter a 
variety of operational difficulties. A recent study, for instance, shows that 
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territorialization of solar thermal technology in Shenzhen failed as a result of a lack of 
alignment and compatibility between the technology and the city’s sociospatial settings 
(Huang et al. 2018).  
The second political process, stabilizing incumbent regimes, explains how 
radical and progressive changes are inevitably confronted with contestations, which can 
induce conflicts and resistance (Geels 2014). Car owners in Stockholm, for example, 
were not as enthusiastic as the government when biogas transport was first introduced 
in the city, mainly due to limited biogas availability (Vernay et al. 2013, Hjalmarsson 
2015). These forces represent the tendency of the urban society to maintain and 
reproduce incumbent (high carbon) energy regimes, which is closely related to the so-
called ‘lock-in’ of the incumbent technologies (Smith and Stirling 2007). A regime 
represents the establishment, which often possesses a higher position in the ladder of 
power and influence (Smith and Stirling 2007, Scrase and Smith 2009, Lockwood et al. 
2017). This suggests that success of energy transitions might depend on the coupling 
of green visions/strategies with local resources and capacities.  
Finally, the third political process, urban material politics, explains how urban 
materiality accommodates transition politics, following energy flows through urban 
infrastructure networks and the urban fabric (Rutherford 2014, Rutherford and Coutard 
2014, Gailing and Moss 2016, McEwan 2017). The urban materiality might 
concomitantly shoulder great political commitments and impose ‘everyday’ struggles 
during radical transitions (Rutherford 2014). Urban material politics is increasingly 
documented by a rapidly growing body of literature in transition studies (Castán Broto 
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and Bulkeley 2013a, Moss 2014, Gailing and Moss 2016). Materiality is often seen as 
interacting with social practices, where politics arise (Hoffman and Loeber 2016). 
Avelino et al. (2016, p. 559) argue that the politics of materiality ‘is located at the 
interface between governing regimes and practices on the one hand, and sociomaterial 
arrangements on the other hand’.  
In the next section we detail how to deploy the DUET framework 
methodologically to better understand the politics of urban energy transitions in 
Shenzhen, China.  
Study area, methods and data 
Shenzhen is a coastal city located in the southeast of China. Ever since its designation 
as a protected economic zone in 1979, Shenzhen has had rapid urban development. As 
of 2017, its urban built-up area was 923.25 km2 and it hosted a population of 12.52 
million people (SBSM 2018). Shenzhen is a pioneer city in NEV development1. In 2009, 
Shenzhen was designated as one of the 13 national NEV demonstration cities (SSZD 
2017), most of which have a strong industrial base of the automotive sector. Since then, 
Shenzhen has adopted more proactive approaches to facilitate NEV implementation, 
and it has become one of the most successful demonstration cities. As of 2017, the share 
of NEVs in Shenzhen ranked second among the 13 demonstration cities (CATARC et 
al. 2018) and the total ownership of NEVs in Shenzhen reached 156,726, with the most 
E-buses, E-taxis and Electric logistic vehicles among cities in the world (D1EV 2018, 
Southcn 2018, TCSM 2019) (Table 1).  
Table 1. Statistics of NEV implementation in Shenzhen (2011-2017) 
                                                 
1 According to the State Council of China, NEVs include plug-in hybrid electric vehicles, battery electric vehicles, 
and fuel cell vehicles. (Source: http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2012-07/09/content_2179032.htm) 
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Year Ownership of NEVs Growth rate (%) Share of NEVs (%) 
2011 3035 - 0.15 
2012 3961 30.51 0.18 
2013 6895 74.07 0.26 
2014 10919 58.36 0.35 
2015 40719 272.92 1.28 
2016 80828 98.50 2.51 
2017 156726 93.90 4.66 
Source: Transport Commission of Shenzhen Municipality (TCSM) 
The rationale behind the selection of the Shenzhen case lies in the fact that 
Shenzhen had exhibited significant manifestations of an energy transition based on 
NEVs. The NEV technology has embedded in the urban materiality and local economy.  
Indeed, NEVs have already reconfigured Shenzhen’s transportation system, 
especially the public transportation system. In 2017, Shenzhen became the world’s first 
city to electrify 100 percent of its public buses, with a total of 16,359 E-buses running 
on the roads of the city (TCSM 2017a). Shenzhen also has the world’s largest E-taxi 
fleet, with a total of 12,498 E-taxies. As of the end of 2017, E-taxies accounted for 62.5% 
of the total taxi market, and the Shenzhen municipal government plans to establish an 
all-electric taxi system by 2020 (TCSM, 2018). To support the rapid growth of NEVs, 
Shenzhen has accelerated the construction of charging infrastructure. As of July 2017, 
a total of 173 charging stations and 36,550 charging piles have been deployed (TCSM 
2017b). The NEV industry has also played an increasingly important role in Shenzhen’s 
economy. Shenzhen is the birthplace of the largest NEV manufacturer in China, ‘Build 
Your Dreams’ (BYD). A NEV industry cluster has formed in Shenzhen based on 
leading enterprises such as BYD. In 2016, the output of the NEV industry reached 103.8 
billion RMB (about 15.57 billion USD). Since 2009, the average annual growth rate of 
Shenzhen’s NEV industry has exceeded 100% (TCSM 2017c).  
Overall, NEV development in Shenzhen represents a typical energy transition 
in-the-making that has already gained recognition in the transition community (Li et al. 
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2016, Tyfield and Zuev 2016, Huang and Castán Broto 2018). Impressive achievements 
of NEV implementation have demonstrated a radical transitional process, which has 
made it an ideal case for investigating the politics behind urban energy transitions.  
Drawing upon the DUET framework, we show how efforts to bring new 
innovation ideas (NEV experimentation) to a given spatial context (Shenzhen) have 
triggered urban processes of simultaneously destabilizing and stabilizing dominant 
regimes and reconfiguring urban materiality.  
In order to better understand the areas of consensus and controversies in the 
transitional process, we conducted two rounds of interviews between 2013 and 2015. 
We chose this timeframe because it enables more in-depth and detailed observation of 
the politics underlying radical NEV implementation in Shenzhen since 2009, 
particularly in public transport. We interviewed individual from all actor groups 
involved in the energy transition process in Shenzhen, including governmental officials, 
researchers, NEV manufacturers, service providers, and corporate and individual users.  
We interviewed a total of 30 participants through 11 semi-structured individual 
interviews and four group interviews (Table 2).  
Table 2. Interview information 
No Actor type Affiliation of interviewees Date of interview 
Individual interview 
1 Researcher Graduate School at Shenzhen, 
Tsinghua University 
2013-11-02 
2 Researcher Graduate School at Shenzhen, 
Tsinghua University 
2013-11-02 










5 Corporate user Peng Cheng E-taxi Company 2013-11-19 
6 Service provider Li Neng Company 2013-11-19 
7 Manufacturer Shenzhen Wu Zhou Long Motors 2013-11-27 
8 Manufacturer Build Your Dreams 2013-12-03 
9 Manufacturer Build Your Dreams 2013-12-03 
10 Manufacturer Build Your Dreams 2013-12-03 
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Corporate user Shenzhen Bus Group 2013-12-10 
 
Group interview 
1 (5 participants) Individual user 
(Taxi-driver) 
Peng Cheng E-taxi Company 2015-03-08 
2 (5 participants) Individual user 
(Taxi-driver) 
Peng Cheng E-taxi Company 2015-03-10 
3 (6 participants) Individual user 
(Taxi-driver) 
Peng Cheng E-taxi Company 2015-03-14 





We complimented this primary qualitative data with the following secondary data 
sources: documents and bulletins issued by multilevel governments, government 
websites, key public media and web-based reports. These data enable a better 
contextualization of interview data, by providing information on the social and political 
context of events revealed in interviews.  
Analysis and Results 
This section analyses how the three dimensions of urban energy transition 
politics-  destabilizing dominant regimes, reproducing incumbent regimes, and urban 
material politics- are reflected in the Shenzhen case. We first detail the primary actors 
involved in transition politics along with their key capacities and motivations for 
participating in the transition, before explaining how their competing interests shape 
the NEV implementation in Shenzhen through the three DUET political processes.  
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In general, three types of transition actors are involved in the implementation of 
NEVs in Shenzhen: government, industry actors, and end-users (Table 3). They are the 
main stakeholders during the transitional process.  
Table 3. Main transition actors in NEV development in Shenzhen 
Actor type Actors 
Government 
Central government 
Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) 
National Development and Reform Commission 
(NDRC) 
Local government 
Shenzhen Development and Reform Commission 
(Shenzhen DRC) 
Transport Commission of Shenzhen Municipality 
(TCSM) 
Urban Planning, Land and Resources Commission 
of Shenzhen Municipality (Shenzhen UPLRC) 
Industry actor 
NEV manufacturer BYD 
Service provider Li Neng Company 










Private NEV owners 
Multilevel governments possess strong incentives and capacities to shape urban 
energy transitions, through for example regulatory and economic policy instruments. 
For the central government, the NEV industry can ensure energy security and promote 
industrial upgrading. Under China’s authoritarian political system, there are strong 
political motivations for local governments to follow national strategies. In particular, 
the top-down demonstration policy has played a key role in the implementation of new 
energy technologies on the ground (particularly at the city level) (Zhao and Gallagher 
2007, Lo 2014). Demonstration cities are obligated to accomplish the targets set by the 
central government for technology application and diffusion. Therefore, for the 
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Shenzhen municipal government, one trigger for proactive implementation of NEVs is 
Shenzhen’s designation as a national NEV demonstration city.  
In addition to political motivations, there are also environmental and economic 
incentives to implement NEV development. The promotion of NEVs in Shenzhen can 
not only improve the urban environment but can also boost the urban economy through 
the development of local enterprises such as BYD (Li et al. 2016). However, consensus 
needs to be reached among different departments within the municipal government. As 
the main responsible department, the Shenzhen Development and Reform Commission 
(Shenzhen DRC) has actively led NEV implementation. In contrast, the Transport 
Commission of Shenzhen Municipality (TCSM), the department responsible for the 
management of urban public transportation, was initially rather skeptical about large-
scale application of E-buses and E-taxies in Shenzhen. The main concern of TCSM lies 
in the increase in management costs and the potential financial burden for public 
transport operators (Interviewee 7, 2013-11-27). Moreover, provision of charging 
infrastructure for NEVs would greatly reconfigure the urban materiality, which requires 
the coordination of departments such as the Urban Planning, Land and Resources 
Commission of Shenzhen Municipality (Shenzhen UPLRC).   
Also, as one of the main transition actors, the private sector possesses 
substantial transition capacities, and enterprises actively engage in urban transitions 
under strong economic incentives (Huang and Castán Broto 2018). For example, BYD 
is a main player in NEV implementation in Shenzhen. The rise of BYD, in turn, is 
inseparable from favorable policies and public resources provided by multilevel 
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governments. Statistics show that more than 90% of the E-buses in Shenzhen were 
manufactured by BYD. Similar to NEV manufacturers, NEV service providers, such as 
Li Neng Company and the Southern Grid of China (SGC), also regard NEV 
implementation as a promising business opportunity and they seize the chance to 
cultivate the market niche. 
Finally, compared with the government and industry actors, end-users 
(including both corporate users and individual users) are equipped with the weakest 
transition capacity and play a relatively passive role in the transition process. Different 
from government and industry actors, end-users, particularly individual users, often 
exhibit more heterogeneity in their transition perspectives, take plural stances, and hold 
more disparate opinions, the main reason for which could be individualized experiences 
and preferences.  
In what follows, we show how different actors with differing interests and 
transition capacities together shape the politics behind NEV implementation in 
Shenzhen.  
Destabilizing Dominant Regimes: The role of multilevel governance in 
destabilizing the internal combustion engine (ICE) regime 
As early as 1991, the Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) started the 
development of NEVs. Since then, NEV implementation has been articulated in many 
national policies, including through specific implementation targets. However, it 
remains unclear how this top-level design is scaled-down and territorialized in local 
contexts. After Shenzhen’s designation as the national NEV demonstration city in 2009, 
 15 
the municipal government established the ‘NEV Implementation Leading Group’. The 
mayor was appointed as director and the Shenzhen DRC as the lead department in order 
to form leadership and adapt transition institutions for prompt decision-making, In July 
2009, the Shenzhen DRC issued the ‘Work Plan for the Demonstration and 
Implementation of NEVs (2009-2012)’, in which three NEV market segments were 
highlighted: state-owned public service vehicles, public transport, and privately owned 
vehicles.   
Because NEVs are more expensive and have a more limited performance range 
than the internal combustion engine (ICE) vehicles, radical implementation of NEVs, 
particularly in public transport, is a great challenge for urban management. Various 
measures have been developed. For example, one novel business model, called the 
‘financial leasing, separating vehicle and battery, and combining charging and 
maintenance’ model, has been proposed by Li Neng Company and supported by the 
municipal government. The Shenzhen Bus Group pays the same amount of money that 
they pay for an ICE bus. Li Neng pays the rest of the price and leases the bus to the 
Shenzhen Bus Group, keeping the ownership of the battery and providing an 8-year 
warranty for the battery. The Shenzhen Bus Group pays Li Neng the amount of money 
they normally spend on oil as charging fees, and Li Neng thus profits on the price 
difference between electricity and oil (Interviewee 6, 2013-11-19). Because this 
business model can to a great extent reduce the financial burden on bus companies, it 
has been very successful in Shenzhen.  
Among many incentives, multilevel governments consider subsidies to be an 
effective policy instrument, which is especially important for opening up a niche market 
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for privately owned NEVs. In June 2010, Shenzhen was selected as one of five pilot 
cities for the provision of subsidies to privately purchased NEVs (Wu et al. 2016). The 
subsidy package consisted of both national and local subsidies. Subsidies are directly 
provided to NEV enterprises, who recalculate the price based on subsidies when they 
put their products in the market. The purchase price for NEVs has been substantially 
reduced by government subsidies, with a maximum discount of 120,000 RMB (about 
17,640 USD) for every vehicle (SSZD 2010). The price of one type of NEV produced 
by BYD, for example, decreased nearly 50%, from 169,800 RMB (about 24,961 USD) 
to 89,800 RMB (about 13,201 USD) (ibid.). As a result, NEVs are significantly more 
affordable to consumers. However, the utilization of financial instruments is not 
without problems. One highly contentious issue is subsidy fraud, which was quite 
prevalent and involved not only small enterprises, but also some large manufacturers. 
In 2016, the central government launched a fraud investigation, in which five NEV 
enterprises were exposed and fined for subsidy fraud, and Shenzhen Wu Zhou Long 
Motors was one of them (MOF 2016). Reports show that 1.67 billion RMB (about 0.25 
billion USD) of subsidies have been acquired by NEV enterprises by illegal means (Hu 
2017). Subsidy fraud reflects the complexity of urban energy transitions: some industry 
actors may pursue short-term benefits while sacrificing the long-term development of 
the industry. 
In addition to subsidies, municipal governments have also limited ICE vehicle 
ownership through a license plate control policy. Since January 2015, the total number 
of vehicle license plates issued every year has been limited to 100,000, of which 20,000 
are exclusively allocated to NEVs (TCSM 2015). This policy instrument has significant 
stimulating effect on the application of NEVs. Catalyzed by policies such as these, the 
growth rate of NEVs sky rocketed from 58.36% in 2014 to 272.92% in 2015 (Table 1).  
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Overall, multiple governance efforts have been devoted to nurturing a market 
niche and to destabilize the incumbent regime of ICE vehicles not only by multilevel 
governments but also through the coordination between local government and other 
urban actors, especially industry actors.  
Reproducing Incumbent Regimes: Resistance to NEVs from end users 
 ‘The implementation of NEVs threatens the interests of many parties. It is much 
harder to change current interest distribution than to change the soul…’ 
(Interviewee 4, 2013-11-27) 
NEV directly challenges the ICE car regime. In Shenzhen, there have been intense 
conflicts between the NEV-empowering protective space and the incumbent ICE 
regime. This is particularly the case for the public transport sector, where NEVs have 
been more radically implemented by the Shenzhen DRC and the number of NEVs has 
been rapidly increasing.  
In fact, at the beginning, disparate narratives existed even within the municipal 
government. As one of the main responsible departments, the TCSM, for example, was 
initially reluctant to increase the number of E-buses. As indicated by one interviewee: 
‘They [TCSM] tend to resist newly emerging things. From the perspective of 
management, it [NEV] decouples the original interest chain. Additionally, the 
top-down governance approach of the Shenzhen DRC tends to provoke 
resistance of the Shenzhen Bus Group.’ (Interviewee 7, 2013-11-27) 
The Shenzhen Bus Group, which operated on behalf of the ICE public 
transportation regime, once openly refused to use E-buses at a large scale, claiming that 
 18 
E-buses still have unsolved problems such as safety issues, high repair and maintenance 
costs, and limited continuous voyage capability.  
Another arena of contestation is E-taxi implementation, represented by 
disparate narratives among individual end-users such as taxi drivers and passengers.  
For taxi drivers, although the government offers substantial incentives, many 
interviewees noted that they still favor driving ICE taxis over E-taxis, citing concerns 
about the safety issues of E-taxis. Among taxi drivers, there have long been concerns 
that E-taxis are radioactive and detrimental to health, and some taxi-drivers thus even 
refuse to drive E-taxis. To dispel these doubts, the municipal government and NEV 
enterprises organized several educational activities. For example, BYD organized 
factory tours in which taxi drivers and media were invited to visit the laboratories of 
BYD, where on-site testing of the radiation level of E-taxis was conducted. BYD 
technicians explained the testing results to taxi drivers, which showed that the radiation 
level was even lower than that of a microwave (LGG 2016). The municipal government 
also published an article on its website that refuted the rumor of high radiation in E-
taxis and reported the results of the radiation tests during BYD’s factory tours (TCSM 
2017d). However, interview data confirms that the worries of some taxi drivers have 
still not been fully relieved because of a clear distrust of the government and NEV 
manufacturers.  
In addition, fierce conflicts have arisen between ICE taxi drivers and E-taxi 
drivers. As reported by one E-taxi driver: 
‘We are considered as a big threat to them [ICE taxi drivers]. They blame us for 
stealing away their business…’ (Group Interview 1, 2015-03-08) 
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Similarly, another interviewee described the following: 
‘They [ICE taxi drivers] view us as enemies. Why? Because E-taxis are 
designed to be more comfortable and are favored by passengers. They think it 
is unfair to them, and because of this, sometimes they even play dirty tricks 
behind our back.’ (Group Interview 1, 2015-03-08) 
For taxi-passengers, although some are willing to take E-taxis, others remain 
skeptical about the new technology and wonder if E-taxis are as safe as ICE taxis. The 
safety concern of E-taxis was particularly fueled by a traffic accident in 2012. A 
speeding car crashed into a BYD E-taxi. The E-taxi exploded and burst into flames, 
killing all three people. This accident had at that time received wide public attention 
and was even reported by international media such as Reuters (2012) and the New York 
Times (2012). After the accident, the safety of E-taxis, and especially their batteries, 
was strongly questioned by the public (NEA 2012). Although BYD’s battery was later 
eliminated as the cause of the explosion in an independent expert investigation report, 
the negative influence on the market faith was sustained for months.  
Taxi-driver and passenger interests, therefore demonstrate that disparate 
narratives exist among different stakeholders around the implementation of NEVs in 
Shenzhen and that efforts to destabilize the ICE regime encounter resistance to change. 
This tendency to maintain the incumbent regime is still strong, particularly under 
changing and contested public discourse.  
It is worth noting that, because NEV implementation in Shenzhen represents an 
urban energy transition in-the-making, the landscape of politics between stakeholders 
has not yet manifested fully. The contestation between the NEV-empowering protective 
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space and the incumbent ICE regime is a primary dynamic of transition politics. As 
transition deepens, particularly as the market share of privately owned NEVs expands, 
more arenas of conflict are likely to emerge. For instance, political pressure exerted on 
multi-level governments might increase as actors representing the ICE car regime (not 
only ICE car manufacturers but also oil companies) conduct more extensive and 
intensive lobbying activities to maintain their dominance in the sector, and 
socioeconomic problems might also be induced when the replacement of ICE vehicles 
leads to industrial restructuring and employment relocation (Hildermeier and Villareal 
2011). 
Urban Material Politics: The challenges of providing NEV charging facilities 
Urban materiality is the ground for disputes between those actors who, on the one hand, 
challenge the urban regime and, on the other, defend/reproduce it. Urban political 
processes are thus also represented by the politics of urban materiality, in particular the 
materialities of infrastructures. Indeed, there was a dynamic politics around the 
reconfiguration of urban materiality during the implementation of NEVs in Shenzhen.  
One of the key urban facilities for NEVs is charging infrastructure. In Shenzhen, 
the further implementation of NEVs faces a difficult dilemma: on one hand, a lack of 
charging infrastructure is a major obstacle for scaling up the private market; on the 
other hand, the relatively small market of privately owned NEVs gives little incentive 
for investors to invest in charging infrastructure. Although the municipal government 
has been active in facilitating the construction of charging infrastructure, the city faces 
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a major challenge in the provision of urban land. Shenzhen is a city with very limited 
land resources. The total land area of the city is 1996.78 km2, of which more than 70% 
is mountainous and not developable (SWRB 2016). Against a general situation of land 
shortage, it is extremely difficult to allocate land for charging stations in central urban 
areas. As expressed by one interviewee: 
‘Right now charging infrastructure is lacking. Shenzhen is a city with very 
limited land resources, and land use is a major obstacle.’ (Interviewee 5, 2013-
11-19) 
The difficulty is also institutional. On the one hand, land use for the construction 
of charging stations is not considered in urban land use planning; on the other hand, it 
is also very difficult to make amendments to previous land use plans that have been 
legally approved by national and provincial governments. One service provider said 
that: 
“It is very difficult to construct charging stations. In urban planning, there is no 
land use category for charging stations and charging piles, which right now can 
only be registered as ‘temporal buildings’.” (Interviewee 6, 2013-11-19) 
This difficulty of land provision is especially acute for the construction of bus 
charging stations, which require larger tracts of land and involve the coordination of 
different government departments. In March 2014, the deputy Prime Minister of the 
State Council hosted a meeting in Shenzhen, a key issue of which was the construction 
of charging infrastructures. After the meeting, the deputy Prime Minister called a 
meeting of relevant departments of Shenzhen Municipality and urged solutions for land 
provision for charging stations in Shenzhen. Under pressure from the central 
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government, the Shenzhen UPLRC drew up the land use planning for charging 
infrastructure to tackle the constraints of urban land use. However, even if agreement 
is eventually reached between the different departments within the municipal 
government, land provision for charging infrastructure construction involves more 
social stakeholders, and it is often very difficult to align disparate/conflicting interests. 
For example, news media reported that a project to construct a bus charging station in 
a residential neighborhood, which was planned and approved by the government, 
encountered strong resistance from residents in that neighborhood. Residents worried 
that potential safety problems could be incurred such as electrical leakage and fire 
hazards. Under strong resistance, the project was eventually terminated (LGG 2016).  
The provision of charging facilities to private NEV users is more complicated 
than the construction of bus charging stations, which are mainly operated and invested 
in by large state-owned operators such as Li Neng Company and the SGC and have 
enjoyed more government support. Since 2013, the SGC has not invested in the 
construction of charging piles but instead encourages NEV owners to install charging 
piles in their own parking lots. However, users encounter many difficulties. The 
strongest opposition often comes from the real estate management company, which is 
in charge of the maintenance and management of the entire residence community. Real 
estate management companies lack incentives to support the installation of NEV 
charging piles because this would considerably increase their management cost and 
because they are also concerned with the potential safety hazards of charging piles. In 
2016, the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) issued “Notice on 
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Accelerating the Construction of Electric Vehicle Charging Infrastructure in 
Residential Areas”, in which it is specified that the real estate management company 
should play a more active role in supporting the construction charging infrastructure. 
Paradoxically, in infrastructure provision, despite the fact of urgent needs for 
more charging infrastructure, existing charging facilities are not fully or efficiently 
utilized, mainly due to fierce competition between NEVs and ICE vehicles over parking 
space. Because parking space is a particularly scarce resource in Shenzhen, many 
parking lots with charging piles are often occupied by ICE vehicles and thus cannot be 
used by NEVs. According to an investigation published by an NGO, of the 3,697 public 
parking lots equipped with charging piles, 41.33% were occupied by ICE vehicles 
(PowerLife 2017). This represents a great challenge for urban governance.  
Overall, urban materiality is the battleground during NEV implementation. 
Major disputes revolve around the construction and provision of charging infrastructure 
for NEVs. Land use is a primary constraint, and the alignment of different interest 
parties is difficult. More efficient use of existing charging facilities is another issue for 
which fierce competition between NEVs and ICE vehicles over (scarce) parking space 
is evident. It is worth noting that, given the present scale of NEVs in Shenzhen, 
significant pressure on the power grid has not yet been exerted, which is an important 
facet of urban materiality. In preparation for the increase of NEVs and the deepening 
of the transition, a central task in Shenzhen’s “13th Five-year Plan for Energy 
Development” is to strengthen the power grid to ensure the capability to meet the future 
electricity supply needs of NEVs.    
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Discussion: toward the ‘reflexivity’ of transition governance 
NEV development in Shenzhen provides an exemplary illustration of the politics of 
urban energy transitions as conceptualized in the DUET framework. The Shenzhen case 
shows that multilevel governments possess strong capacities to shape urban energy 
transitions by deploying various policy instruments to nurture the NEV market niche 
and to destabilize the ICE regime. In particular, NEVs have been radically applied in 
urban public transport, which has encountered substantial resistance both within the 
municipal government and from other actors such as bus companies and taxi drivers. 
Although it is unsurprising that industry actors have proven to be particularly important 
players in urban energy transitions, this case illuminates some creative strategies they 
have used to destabilize dominant regimes. For example, innovative business models 
have been designed to relieve financial pressures exerted on public transport operators 
by separating the ownership of vehicles and batteries. In Shenzhen, a strong coalition 
exists between the local government and industry players, in which urban priorities 
(particularly the priority of boosting local economies) are in alignment with industry 
interests in NEV implementation. However, due to the profit-driven nature of 
enterprises, industry actors might in some cases jeopardize the transition in pursuit of 
short-term economic benefits. In contrast to government and industry actors, who 
actively and coherently engage in urban energy transitions, end-users are more passive 
and exhibit substantial heterogeneity in their transition perspectives. This heterogeneity 
is reflected particularly in the disparate narratives that exist among both taxi-drivers 
and passengers.  
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NEV implementation in Shenzhen has been influenced by some elements of 
authoritarianism. For example, Shenzhen’s designation as a national demonstration city 
has provided strong political incentives for the municipal government to implement 
NEVs. NEVs have been radically implemented in public transport in a mandatory 
fashion, and the central government has played an influential role in coordinating 
different departments within the Shenzhen municipal government on the key issue of 
charging infrastructure provision. Under authoritarianism in China, the politics and 
power relations are generally considered more latent and elusive compared with those 
of Western countries. Importantly, the Shenzhen case shows that even under the 
authoritarian governance system in China, transition actors possess considerable 
agency in shaping the trajectory of urban energy transitions. For example, local 
residents’ resistance resulted in the termination of the construction of a bus charging 
station in their neighbourhood. Further, the case demonstrates how government actors 
often encounter uncertainties and must adapt to new situations. For example, the case 
shows how the municipal government reacted promptly in addressing public concerns 
after the BYD E-taxi accident and eventually oriented the discourse toward a more 
positive view of the new technology. This suggests a certain level of policy learning 
and adaptation in the Shenzhen case. 
This learning reflects recent calls in the transition community for ‘reflexivity’ 
in transition governance (Smith and Stirling 2007, Jaglin 2014). In the face of dynamic 
urban political processes (disputes, ambivalences and conflicts), the reflexivity of 
transition governance recognizes the agency of not only governments and industry 
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actors but also other transition actors such as end-users (Hendriks and Grin 2008, 
Meadowcroft 2009). It moves away from examining and illuminating ‘power’ to get it 
‘out of the way’ to dynamizing and opening up constitutive power relations themselves. 
Reflexive transition institutions coevolve with changing politics by continuously 
repositioning themselves and readjusting their roles in the transformation process 
(Scrase and Smith 2009).  
This study uncovers the messy and contingent character of urban energy 
transitions and accentuates the importance of acknowledging, accepting and dealing 
with conflicts and contestations. It is politics that stands behind policy, it is politics that 
mediates (critical) transition decisions, and it is politics that serves as a mechanism to 
resolve conflicts and avoid serious consequences. Therefore, politics offers policy-
makers the opportunity of policy-learning and readjustment. In sum, transition politics, 
as illustrated in the Shenzhen case, points to the necessity of incorporating ‘reflexivity’ 
into transition governance, which eventually cultivates ‘the capacity for continuous and 
self-conscious societal reflection, assessment, and readjustment’ via policy learning 
and interactive decision-making (Meadowcroft 2009, p.323). 
6. Conclusions 
Politics is at the heart of energy transitions because such transitions necessarily involve 
the redistribution of benefits and costs, and there are inevitably conflicting visions of 
the scope, direction and speed of the transformation among transition actors (Markard 
2018). However, there is a tendency in transition theories to downplay the political 
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dimension of energy transitions. Premised on Meadowcroft’s (2009) view that energy 
transition is a chaotic, uncertain, and open-ended ‘reality’ that engages diverging 
interests, competing visions, and complex power relations, this article applies the 
DUET framework (Huang and Castán Broto, 2018) to explore the unfolding transition 
politics during NEV implementation in Shenzhen city. We show how two contesting 
processes of urban energy transitions (destabilizing and stabilizing dominant regimes) 
confront each other in and manifest through urban materialities. On the one hand, 
multilevel governments have provided various incentives to steer the use of NEVs in 
Shenzhen; on the other hand, implementation of a new technology has fueled tensions 
and disputes between urban actors. For example, major disputes revolve around the 
reconfiguration of urban materialities, particularly the construction of charging 
infrastructure for NEVs.   
Cities are playing an increasingly central role in advancing meaningful and 
fundamental transformations. Against the deepening and widening of sustainability 
transitions, sociotechnical experimentation proliferates in different cities in the world 
with the application of new technologies to decarbonize the energy system. NEV 
implementation in Shenzhen represents a case of such urban energy transitions in-the-
making. A key contribution of this study is that it uncovers the contested nature of urban 
energy transitions and the fact that the rhythm of transitions is influenced by a 
constellation of transition actors with varied interests and priorities. It thus adds an 
important, albeit often neglected, political dimension to our understanding of the 
transitional process.  
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Interestingly, despite being situated with authoritarian institutional setting, 
various transition actors in Shenzhen such as the industry actors and end users have 
exhibited substantial agency in shaping the trajectories of the transition. This suggests 
that in more democratic political contexts similar political dynamics exist. These 
dynamics remain underexplored, however, despite their potential contribution to our 
understanding of how cities are increasingly shaping local and global politics in 
different contexts. The politics of energy transitions points toward more complex 
perspectives on the strategies and approaches of urban governance.  
An important policy implication generated from this study is the necessity to 
incorporate reflexivity into transition governance, which goes beyond the Chinese 
context and is also relevant to policy makers in other countries. Reflexive transition 
governance offers novel and potentially productive ways in which transition policy and 
practice alike can engage with a complex, highly politicized, and open-ended transition 
process.   
This study proposes the following avenues for future research. First, the DUET 
framework offers a valuable lens through which to understand the political dimensions 
of urban energy transitions and is worth deploying in other contexts for different 
technologies. Second, this case highlights the need for comparative studies on energy 
transitions between different technologies. With differences in technological 
characteristics, the incentives and power relations of main stakeholders might differ 
and the materialization of technologies into the urban context might exhibit different 
patterns and induce differing political processes. Therefore, comparative studies that 
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account for the differences of technologies can provide more nuanced insights into the 
complexities and varieties of transition politics. 
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